Confessions of Spy Network Elements reveal several methods used for entrapment in operations for enemy’s operations room

The confessions of the elements belonging to the spy network—which the Ministry of Interior announced seizing in the operation titled (And the cunning of those is [what] will perish)—revealed the plots of the American, Zionist, and Saudi enemy, along with the tasks assigned to these cells and the individual roles carried out by each one.

The elements of the spy network, affiliated with a joint operations room between American Intelligence (CIA), Israeli Mossad, and Saudi Intelligence, headquartered in Saudi territories, spoke about how the work of these cells was fundamentally linked to the enemy’s plans aimed at targeting Yemen and its armed forces, and attempting to deter or influence its principled stance in support of Gaza and the Palestinian cause.

The confessions touched upon the training received by these criminal cells from American, Israeli, and Saudi officers in Saudi territories. This training specifically covered how to use the equipment provided to them, write reports, send coordinates, methods of camouflage and concealment, and tasks related to gathering information and monitoring civilian leaders, as well as leaders within the army and security forces and their headquarters.

Regarding the process of attracting the spy cells, Spy Bashir Ali Mahdi, who was recruited in 2018, affirmed that he was entrapped into the cell in two stages: The first was espionage in the social and cultural sectors by establishing the Sustainable Development Capabilities Organization and joining Dar Al Salam Organization in 2018-2019.

He stated, “I was recruited for espionage with the joint operations room in the military sector while I was in the Egyptian capital, Cairo, in October 2023. They contacted me saying that a military operation was coming, which they intended to carry out in Yemen, and they offered me participation in the intelligence aspect.”

He added, “They also asked me to nominate people to work in this area and to attract new cells.”

Meanwhile, Spy Mujahid Mohammed Ali, who was recruited in 2024, indicated that he was contacted by a person named Ali Qassem al-Bakali, who incentivized him to perform work for Saudi intelligence and asked him for a team, leading to the selection of two individuals.

He said, “I was asked to recruit other spies from several governorates who had means of transportation, were capable of movement, and could execute espionage tasks and activities for the benefit of the enemy’s joint operations room.”

Spy Daifullah Saleh, recruited in 2024, also spoke about how he was entrapped into espionage activities and linked to Saudi officers within the enemy’s joint operations room, receiving money to obtain a passport from Marib governorate.

As for Spy Abdulaziz Ali, who was recruited in 2023, he confirmed that he was entrapped at the end of 2024 into intelligence espionage work for the joint operations room. He was offered financial incentives and temptations to carry out several tasks, jobs, and activities under various names, such as “organizations, companies, and others.”

He reported that he received training on how to file reports on population density and monitor statistics and data related to the population in Yemen.

Furthermore, Spy Majdi Mohammed Hussein, recruited in 2022, provided a summary of how he was attracted to work with the enemy’s joint operations room through an offer of employment. He was asked for qualifications and given an interview.

He said, “The work I was to execute was clarified, and contact and coordination were made with me to meet in Cairo.”

For his part, Spy Anas Ahmed Saleh, recruited in 2025, spoke about how he was entrapped by Saudi intelligence last Sha’aban month through work at a relief and humanitarian company, performing surveys of houses and describing their features. He clarified that he was asked to recruit new people to work with him and was given three names to pursue.

Spy Khalid Qassim Abdullah, recruited in 2024, said, “I was attracted at the beginning of 2024 by my friend Nasser al-Shaybah due to my knowledge of leaders present in several areas of the capital, Sana’a, and was asked to help him notify him of those leaders’ homes and install surveillance cameras on them.”

For her part, Spy Huda Ali, recruited in 2023, confessed to being entrapped to work with the enemy’s joint operations room by a Toyota taxi owner named Nasser al-Shaybah, through daily taxi rides in the capital, Sana’a.

She said, “Nasser al-Shaybah asked me to attract new people to work in this area.”

From his perspective, Spy Ali Ali Ahmed, recruited in 2024, confirmed that an individual named Ali Rajeh entrapped him to work for Saudi intelligence by leading him to believe there was a job with Saudi people in exchange for Saudi Riyal amounts.

He stated, “The work was clarified to me as merely writing reports on training courses to be sent to the Saudis, and he asked me to nominate five people to work in this field.”

Additionally, Spy Hammoud Hassan Hammoud, recruited in 2024, confessed to being entrapped into intelligence work for the joint operations room, which involved monitoring leaders at the ports of al-Salif and Ras Isa, monitoring and photographing merchant ships, and being lured with a sum of money and provided with a phone for photographing sites.