Confessions of spy network reveal transfer methods, modern devices & main hostile activities

The confessions of members of the spy network that the Ministry of Interior said it had arrested in Operation “And the Plot of Those Is Lost” revealed the mechanisms and means provided to the spies to carry out their intelligence and espionage tasks, and the most prominent hostile activities.

Members of the spy network — which belonged to a joint operations room between the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Israeli Mossad and Saudi intelligence, headquartered on Saudi territory — confirmed that the operations room supplied them with vehicles fitted with advanced surveillance and network‑analysis systems, and with tracking devices.

According to the network’s cells, Saudi officers from the joint operations room summoned the spies with means of transport to Riyadh to install surveillance systems , devices on the vehicles and to train them on how to use them for assigned missions.

The spy Magdi Muhammad Hussein stated that the enemy’s operations room provided him with a car equipped with advanced modern surveillance and espionage devices, which was delivered to him indirectly in the capital Sana’a, and that he was trained remotely on how to use them to carry out missions assigned by officers in the enemy’s joint operations room.

He said, “I was contacted and informed that a car had arrived in Sana’a from Aden, and I was asked to specify a place to receive it. It was a 2018 Elantra, silver, with a black sticker over the Hyundai emblem on the rear trunk; I was asked to remove it.”

He pointed out that a camera was hidden under the sticker and that it would help carry out the missions assigned to him by photographing targeted sites. He described the devices implanted in the car: a modem into which an internet SIM card is inserted; a server with storage for photos and videos captured by the camera; six antennas and an additional antenna near or behind the fuel‑tank cover.

According to Magdi’s confessions, he was summoned to Riyadh and asked to change the vehicle, under the pretext that it might be monitored or had been observed by security services at several locations. They told him to sell the car, dismantle the devices inside it and transfer them to another vehicle to take into Riyadh, install the devices and be trained on them.

He added: “I entered Riyadh and was contacted by Abu Saif (a Saudi). He asked me to go to a place in the Al‑Arid district to hand over the car and its devices. He gave me 500 Saudi riyals to rent a hotel while the device installation was completed over six days. Afterwards I handed the car over when I met a man called Abu Yasser from the Qassim line; I went with him in his car to Al‑Arid. We drove through alleys until we reached the rest house and were received by the technician responsible for installing the devices.”

Magdi said the technician trained him on how to use the devices installed in the car: a camera mounted above the car’s trunk, connected to a modern phone and a server with two “eyes,” speakers, and a link device from the modem to the server, to enable him to execute his espionage mission.

He continued: “I was asked to go to sites to photograph them using the GPS mapping app; sometimes I was told to fully turn on the devices, and other times to stay at a targeted site for twenty minutes. The operator from the enemy’s joint operations room would guide me to photograph those sites.”

The spy Ali Ali Ahmad said that on 10 March 2025 he was summoned by Saudi officers to bring the car into Riyadh. He communicated with an officer named Abdullah (a Saudi) and handed the car keys to two people for inspection and return.

He said, “We stayed four days and the car was returned. They told me that an advanced espionage device for identifying targeted locations had been installed. I was sent to sites with nearby housing for training. The training involved sending coordinates to be entered into the application to identify the target, then beginning to photograph it from several directions and angles according to the training.”

Ali described the missions assigned to him, which included photographing and mapping networks from residential buildings on Al‑Khamsin Street and a mosque in the capital Sana’a, preparing a detailed report about them and sending it to the Saudi officer Abu Amer in the enemy’s joint operations room.

He said, “A set of coordinates was sent to me for Al‑Qishlah Square in ’Amran to photograph the buildings of the Security Directorate and the local council, and to upload a comprehensive report on the buildings and citizens’ movements and send it to the operator officer in the enemy’s joint operations room.”

The spy Anas Ahmad Saleh described hostile missions he carried out, including reconnaissance, photographing and reporting on several residential buildings in Sana’a, one of them a four‑ or five‑story building next to the civil status office that was later targeted by U.S. airstrikes.

He explained that the Saudi officer Abu Saif contacted him and tasked him with photographing another building adjacent to the first one, which was a commercial building.

He said, “Days later the Saudi officer Abu Saif sent me coordinates during Ramadan for a residential area in Sana’a, asking for a video of the entire area. It was photographed and delivered to him.”

The spy Bashir Ali Mahdi spoke about the main hostile espionage activities and tasks assigned to him, which included monitoring and collecting information on the state’s political, military and security leaders at the first and second levels — their residences and places of presence.

He said that among the key hostile espionage activities assigned to him were reconnaissance and information‑gathering on the missile force, unmanned aerial systems and manufacturing workshops, , monitoring leaders and media institutions affiliated with Ansar Allah by nominating people to carry out these tasks.

He said, “People were nominated to carry out the intelligence mission under the cover of an organization called ‘Butra for Sustainable Development.’ We agreed not to contact by phone for security precautions, and to meet every Tuesday and Thursday at 10 a.m.”

The spy Mujahid Muhammad Ali addressed the main hostile activities assigned to him, which involved uploading coordinates — including during Ramadan 1446 AH (April 2025) — to search for any military targets such as buildings, camps, unmanned aircraft, hypersonic missiles, rocket launch sites, and areas from which missiles are launched toward occupied Palestine.

He said, “Among the tasks assigned to me was uploading coordinates of newly established camps, meeting young Ansar Allah members, listening to them and using some of the information they provided, which would be included in a report to be sent to Saudi intelligence.”

The spy Daifullah Saleh discussed major hostile activities in monitoring and reporting locations from which rockets are launched toward occupied Palestine.

He said, “Officer Abdullah (a Saudi) tasked me with coordinates to photograph a place he described as a camp; I photographed it and prepared a report. I photographed a detention facility that this Saudi told me had been targeted in two raids. He asked about the type of target and whether there were casualties; I replied that I didn’t know and there was no news. Later that day I informed him there were reports of African casualties — a hangar used by Africans, not Yemenis, had been struck and at least seventy were killed.”

He added, “There was a set of coordinates sent by officer Abdullah for a location beside Al‑Rasoul Al‑A‘tham Oncology Hospital in Sa‘ada; I photographed the site and days later the hospital was targeted, specifically during the month of Ramadan.”

Daifullah admitted to photographing public streets via a mobile app at the request of officer Abdullah, who also asked him to install another device either in a car or a motorcycle and told him his salary would be 6,000 Saudi riyals.

He continued, “He insisted on the matter; I told him I needed a three‑month delay and asked whether the device operates with a SIM card, battery, or is pocket‑sized or large, and whether it links to a personal phone. He replied that it links to a SIM card and that a SIM would be sent.”

He reported that a coffee blender had been sent to him in Sana’a; when someone called to collect it, there was a 20‑gram piece of gold inside equivalent to two months’ pay.

The spy Sinan Abdulaziz Ali confirmed that officer Abdullah contacted him two months later to request that he pick up a car arriving from Aden, specifying the site. He moved immediately to collect it; the car key was attached with a sticker above the front passenger fender.

He said, “We started the car and left. He told me there were things I would be taught, and I went into the alley where there was an empty playground and stopped there in 2024. The Saudi officer asked me to open a compartment of the car; inside the car’s trim were three devices: a SIM‑insertion device, another black device with a large memory and several ports, and a third device located by the fuel tank with a fan. A fourth tracking device was found at the ignition button under the dashboard; I was told to remove it and keep it.”

Sinan pointed out that there was a camera in the trunk compartment and on the trunk door, where only the camera head was visible.

He added, “Among the missions I was tasked with were reconnaissance, photographing and submitting reports on several residential buildings in Sana’a using a vehicle equipped with espionage technologies. My movements were monitored by the operations room; I received instructions and guidance from the operators.”

He confessed that he carried out approximately 15 missions, during which he received directions on how to photograph the targeted site; missions lasted from one and a half to three hours.

He continued, “Abu Saif told me to have my phone on at 3 p.m. and said our mission that day would be different: to photograph a crowd. He sent me the coordinates and asked me to move to them. I sat in the car; the site was in front of Al‑Tazaj restaurant.”

He confirmed that one of his main tasks assigned by the Saudi officer Abu Saif, ten days after a site in front of the Sam hall was targeted, was to go to another site to place two concrete blocks in front of the hall, and he was later tasked with placing a block containing a tracking and photographing device at a targeted site. He stated that in total he executed missions at 100 sites, about 70 percent of which were homes, including six mosques.

The spy Hamoud Hassan Hamoud explained that the targets he uploaded to the enemy’s joint operations room included photographing a red ship loaded with wheat, photographing another ship, a third ship, all anchored at the estuary (al‑ghatis) and not in the port, and these were sent to the operations room.

He said, “The operator from the enemy’s joint operations room contacted me about the tanks in Ras ‘Isa — two diesel and one petrol — and I photographed the salt crusher.”

The female spy Huda Ali said she went with Nasser al‑Shaibah to Sana’a International Airport, where a colleague working at the airport facilitated her entry , they installed tracking and spying devices on one parked car the size of a pill and colored leaden (gray).

She said, “On Iran Street there was a house and I was asked to go beside it to place the device.”

The spy Khalid Qasim Abdullah reported that in August 2024 Nasser al‑Shaibah surveilled a house on Iran Street next to the Sam hall and placed a camera on the house shaped like small buttons aimed at the house’s gates to monitor who entered and exited.

He said, “Nasser called me and I went out with him. He told me he wanted to go to the same previously surveilled site to place another camera and wanted my help to place that camera differently inside a concrete block on 21 December 2024; he put it on the curb facing the house gates, and he also placed another camera similarly inside a block at the nursery with trees on the curb in front of the house.”